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The Peloponnesian War, fought between Athens and
Sparta from 431 to 404 BC, pitted the two most powerful
Greek city-states against one another in a conflict that
has much to teach us about ancient warfare and military strategy. In Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today, Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos
seek to demonstrate that “although material conditions
may change, the logic of conflict between organised entities remains constant throughout the millennia” (p. xi).
While not dismissing the historical value of Thucydides’
tome The History of the Peloponnesian War, they rank it
among the best pieces of strategic military analysis, to be
compared to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Clausewitz’s
On War. The authors adhere to their goal in presenting
a tight, focused, and clear analysis of Thucydides’ understanding of grand strategy in the Peloponnesian War; the
book will be especially useful to students of military history who already maintain a strong background in the
historical circumstances of the war.

gent review of the differences between the Athenian and
Spartan poleis, an introduction that sets the stage for the
conflict between the two city-states that formed the basis of Thucydides’ History. In chapters 3 and 4, the authors present a clear case for understanding the grand
strategies of Athens and Sparta in the initial phases of
the war as quite opposite, with Athens (under the leadership of Pericles) favoring a strategy of exhaustion and the
Spartans pursuing a strategy of annihilation to counteract what they perceived to be an unfavorable status quo.
Platias, who retains sole responsibility (according to the
preface) for the content of the third chapter, mounts a defense of the Periclean grand strategy and Athenian naval
reliance. The author addresses various critiques of the
effectiveness of the Periclean policy, although one often
feels that the argument (carried also into the next chapter) reads as an Athenocentric apologia and eschews any
counternarrative, with several important pieces on the
issue missing from the bibliography.[1]
Platias and Koliopoulos locate the turning point of
the war in the Athenian decision to invade Sicily in 415
BC (a classic case of “overextension”) and the intensification of Persian monetary aid to the Spartan cause (p.
78). It was after this disaster that the Spartan army was
able to match its means to its intended end and shift the
balance of power to her side. The final chapter of the
book proposes that the application of the Thucydidean
model of grand strategy can serve as predictive of more
modern conflicts and appraises the use of the annihilation and exhaustion strategies as a function of recent
international relations and technological developments.

The first chapter plays a definitory role, clearly summarizing with historical examples various levels of military strategy (e.g., offensive, defensive, compellent, deterrent) and tactics. The authors give a conceptual typology of grand strategy (which they define as the way in
which states “ensure security”) to lay the foundation for
their focus on this aspect of Thucydides’ description of
the war between Athens and Sparta. Their definition of
“grand strategy” is inclusive, drawing together elements
of domestic and international legitimacy, diplomacy, and
military action. The second chapter is an extremely co-
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The last portion of the chapter highlights the Athenian
blunders in Sicily as the result of the underestimation
of the enemy, and the authors take the opportunity to
compare the disaster with more modern instances of the
same phenomenon. Throughout, the authors emphasize
the importance of perception (internal and external) to
the decision-making apparatuses of ancient and modern
warfare.

ing of Thucydides’ sophisticated conceptualization of the
Peloponnesian Wars, their work is best when considered in tandem with a study of contemporary (including Thucydidean) commentary on Greek cultural life and
mores and their profound differences from our own.
Thus, the book should be read in conjunction with a
full translation of Thucydides (recommended is Robert
Strassler’s The Landmark Thucydides, 1998) and a modern
summary of the work (e.g., Lawrence Tritle, A New HisThe authors contend that Thucydides, often studied tory of the Peloponnesian War, 2010), as in many cases the
as the first international relations theorist, has not re- authors mention an issue essential to an understanding
ceived as much attention as he deserves for his contri- of the war (e.g., The Melian affair, cited on p. 50) with no
bution to our understanding of ancient military strategy.
further commentary. Ultimately, the work of Platias and
While their work is undoubtedly an important contribuKoliopoulos is a helpful addition to our understanding of
tion to this field, it rather disturbingly fails to account for Thucydides as a military strategist and to the outcome of
several important previous contributions on the subject, the great war between Athens and Sparta, although the
such as J. F. Lazenby’s The Peloponnesian War: A Mili- astute reader will want to compare its conclusions with
tary Study (2004) and Theodore Tsakiris’s “Thucydides other contributions on the same topic.
and Strategy” (2006). Troubles also arise when one applies anachronistic terms to Thucydides’ work; the danNote
ger is clear when one browses the appendix on “Strate[1]. Inter alia, Peter Krentz, “The Strategic Culture of
gic Concepts in Thucydides’ History,” where—although it
Periclean
Athens,” in Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics,
is acknowledged that Thucydides did not employ modWar
and
History
in Ancient Greece, ed. Charles Hamilton
ern jargon—passages are taken out of context to prove
and
Peter
Krentz
(Claremont: Regina Books, 1997), 55-72;
that our historian maintained an interest in grand stratIain
Spence,
“Perikles
and the Defense of Attika during
egy. Such an exercise, if performed in the same way,
the Peloponnesian War,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 110
may also prove fruitful in a variety of other ancient
(1990): 91-107; Thomas Kelly, “Thucydides and Spartan
authors (Herodotus included). One constantly wavers
on a tightrope, whereby the application of Thucydidean Strategy in the Archidamian War,” American Historical
(non?)terminology to modern categorizations begins to Review 87 (1982): 25-54; and D. W. Knight, “Thucydides
and the War Strategy of Perikles,” Mnemosyne 23 (1970):
feel uncomfortably forced.
150-61.
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